中觀論南傳佛教看法Theravāda Perspectives on the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā

《中觀論》南傳佛教看法

 

大家好！

 

有些讀者想知道以下的AI資料內容的真實性。

 

「某些上座部論師的批評   近代或現代部分上座部學者，對龍樹提出過質疑，例如： •  認為「一切法皆空」的觀點會導致否定業報與輪迴，是傾向斷見或虛無主義； •  有些批評者甚至會用「非佛說」、「邪見」或極端地稱之為「魔說」來指龍樹的    學說，但這屬於個別意見，不代表整體上座部佛教立場。 例如現代知名的上座部比丘： • Bhikkhu Bodhi（菩提比丘）：對大乘哲學持尊重與學術分析態度，認為中觀有其邏輯深度，但指出與上座部核心教義不同。 •有些學者會認為龍樹的哲學是哲學詮釋而非原始佛教教義，但避免極端批評。」

 

半寄：

上面說的其實很簡單，只要弄清楚因緣果的深義，便可知是否需要《中觀論》的解說。

 

如果只害怕「空性」等於「佛說因果論」丟失的話，那不要讀《中論》就好，我都認為沒什麼好爭議的！

 

這個問題有人問我的時候，

我說那簡單，

按照論師的慣例，

你再造一個辯論法駁倒它，就解決了，但我目前還沒有看到。

 

我在我們南禪的讀書會多次提過，承認《中觀論》

等於承認後人的智慧結晶，

《中觀論》其中觀點簡約，

 

屬於我個人的解説：

 

1+1若可以=2

中觀家主張1跟1之間必須是空性。

從來沒說0+0的論點，

讀者自己去琢磨。

 

南傳佛教同樣重視《阿毗達磨》一樣是論典，

你有沒有能力解讀《中觀論》那是讀者自己的事。

《中觀論》不是哲學，

之前的文章說過懂佛陀的教學「因緣法」的可能只有舍利弗跟龍樹菩薩，

也有舉證經典佐證。

 

原始教典大量應用斷字，很多修行或生活都處於斷的事項，

什麼都斷掉了，當然很好處理。

 

而要說明存在性、變化性、延續性，必然需要較高段的思維模式，

這不是已經制式化的心與心所能理解的。

何必說魔？嚇唬誰？

 

半寄

 

 

 

Theravāda Perspectives on the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā

 

Greetings, friends of NanZen!

 

Some readers have asked about the accuracy of the following AI Data:

“Criticism from Certain Theravāda Scholars”   In recent times, some Theravāda scholars have expressed doubts about Nāgārjuna’s teachings. For instance: • They argue that the concept of “emptiness of all phenomena” could imply a rejection of karma and rebirth, leaning toward nihilism or annihilationism. • Some critics have labeled his philosophy as “not the Buddha’s teaching,” “wrong view,” or even, in extreme cases, “a demonic view.” However, these are individual opinions and do not reflect the overall stance of Theravāda Buddhism. For example, one well-known Theravāda monk: • Bhikkhu Bodhi: He holds a respectful and analytical view toward Mahāyāna philosophy. While recognizing the logical depth of the Madhyamaka school, he also highlights its doctrinal differences from Theravāda. • Some scholars view Nāgārjuna’s work as a philosophical interpretation rather than an expression of early Buddhist doctrine, though they avoid overly critical language.

 

Banji:

The issue is rather simple: once one grasps the profound meaning of dependent origination, it becomes clearwhether an explanation from the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā is necessary.

 

If the concern lies merely in the fear that “śūnyatā” might undermine the Buddhist doctrine of karma and causesand effects, then the solution is straightforward — one can simply avoid reading the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. I don’t think there’s anything to argue about.

 

When others raise this question to me, I respond by pointing to the standard methodology among commentators: construct a coherent rebuttal using logical debate, as is traditional. If Nāgārjuna’s reasoning is flawed, formulate a refutation. Yet to date, I have not encountered a successful one.

 

In our NanZen study club, I’ve said many times: accepting the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā means recognizing the wisdom of later generations. The views in the text are concise.

 

My personal interpretation is:

If 1 + 1 = 2,
then the Madhyamaka advocates that the connection between the two “1”s must be “śūnyatā”.
It never proposes that 0 + 0 is the basis of the discussion.

This is something readers ought to contemplate.

 

Likewise, Theravāda Buddhism values texts like the Abhidhamma, which are also post-canonical treatises.
Whether or not one can comprehend the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā depends on the reader’s capacity.

The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā should not be categorized as philosophy.

As previously discussed, perhaps only Śāriputra and Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva truly comprehended the Buddha’s teaching on dependent origination. Scriptural evidence has been provided to support this claim (see the screenshot below for references.The content of the screenshot is not translated.).

 

Early Buddhist texts frequently apply the method of “cutting off.” Many aspects of practice and daily life focus on ending or abandoning certain things. Naturally, when all is cut off, things become easier to handle.

 

Yet, to explain the nature of existence, change, and continuity requires a more advanced mode of thinking—one that surpasses the rigid, systematized processes of the conventional mind and associated mental states..

 

So why call it “demonic”? Who exactly are you trying to frighten?

 

Master Banji

 

 

 

華人佛法

大家好！

有大德會問說昨天的《中論》文章，哪裡不能用華人的視野？

我們怎麼知道？

也有大德會說：

那整個偈語都不是中文，

所以，讀者也得自己去用功

。

用華人的視野例如；

僧肇法師的《物不遷論》中流水比諭，

華人喜歡高山流水，

但是高山流水跟《中觀論》是完全不同的兩回事，

不能一直把文學當佛法，這是大錯特錯的，

如果只要「文學性質的佛法，」

當時的玄奘法師們根本不用去印度留學，

如只要夢幻的佛法，何必動用這麼多資源呢？

無價之寶葬送在夢幻裡，可悲！

半寄

中論第8-9章1 Mulamadhyamakakarika1

 中論第8-9章1

 

大家好！

 

《解讀龍樹菩薩「中論」27道題》第八章，

我在台南讀書會提過，如果能夠弄明白「黑暗」不是自然存在、也不是既定的存在，「黑暗與明亮」也是因緣法構成的，大概就懂了「黑暗與明亮」的無自性。（往下拉，參考5月讀書會內容）

 

因我在現場都是講重點，雖說他、她們也不見得都懂，但也是我反復提到的主要概念，

 

所以不想再回去第8章講，上次就跟讀書會成員約定直接講8、9章。

 

如若定義「絕對性」的因緣法，

必須清楚「因緣中有因緣」，

弄懂這些《中論-空論》便清析明朗。

 

如果覺得下面的截圖文章弄不懂，

可以看看AI的資料，這也是我個人用過的方法之一。

半寄

 

以下AI資料 「中論的無窮倒退（Infinite Regress）」問題，並不是由龍樹自己明確提出這個名詞，但他在《中論》（Mūlamadhyamakakārikā）中對「因果」、「自性」、「實有」等概念的批判，實際上涉及了無窮倒退的邏輯問題。因此，這一論證方式常被後人歸結為「無窮倒退論證」（infinite regress argument），屬於邏輯上的一種reductio ad absurdum（歸謬法）形式。   📚 1. 無窮倒退在《中論》的運用   龍樹針對「自性有」（svabhāva）進行批判時，指出如果事物是本質上自有的，那麼其因果關係將無法成立，導致以下情況之一：   若果從因生，那因也需要一個因，無限倒退； 若因不需因，那它就是永遠存在，果不會生出，因果不能成立。 這樣的論證方式就是用「無窮倒退」來否定「實體有」或「自性有」的可能性。 例如《中論》第1章〈觀因緣品〉中有說： 若有自性者，則無因緣生。 無自性故，故有因緣生。 這正是指出：若執著自性實有，會導致因果斷裂或無限迴圈矛盾。   🧠 2. 誰明確提出「無窮倒退」這個術語？ 龍樹本身沒有使用「無窮倒退」這個詞（這是後代哲學詮釋的用語）。 這個概念在後期的中觀學者（如清辯、月稱）中被更明確闡釋，並在西方哲學中如亞里斯多德、康德等被更清楚地制度化。   所以可說： ✅ 龍樹的中論在內容上已經使用了無窮倒退論證； ❌ 但這個詞（infinite regress）是後來的哲學詮釋，非龍樹創詞。   🔍 補充說明： 在近代中觀詮釋中，無窮倒退經常出現在「否定第一因」、「否定自性存在」或「否定獨立成立之法」的上下文中。 無窮倒退在中觀派中是破斥「自性見」的重要邏輯工具之一。

 



Chapter 8-9 of Nagarjuna’s Middle Way: Mulamadhyamakakarika

 

Greetings, friends of NanZen!

 

Chapter 8 of Nagarjuna's Middle Way: Mulamadhyamakakarika

I mentioned during the Tainan study club that if one can understand that “darkness” is neither naturally existing nor inherently fixed, and that both “darkness and brightness” arise through dependent origination,

then one can grasp the concept of their lack of inherent nature.

(Please scroll down to refer to the notes from the Tainan study club in May.)

 

During the discussion, I typically focused on the essential points. While not everyone may fully grasp them, these are the key ideas I repeatedly emphasize.

 

Therefore, I don’t intend to revisit Chapter 8. We previously agreed with the group to proceed directly to Chapters 8 and 9.

 

If we want to define “the conditional nature of the absolute,”

we must clearly understand that “conditions are embedded within other conditions.”

With this understanding, Nagarjuna’s view of śūnyatābecomes much clearer.

 

If the article shown in the screenshot below seems difficult to follow,

feel free to refer to AI-generated materials — I’ve found them helpful myself.

 

Master Banji

 

AI Data The infinite regress issue in Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK) is not a term explicitly used by Nāgārjuna himself. However, his critiques of causality, intrinsic nature (svabhāva), and substantial existence inherently involve the logic of infinite regress. As a result, later scholars identified this method of reasoning as th einfinite regress argument, which is a form of reductio ad absurdum (proof by contradiction).   1. Application of infinite regress in MMK: Nāgārjuna’s critique of inherent existence shows that if things truly possess self-nature, then causal relationships collapse, leading to two problematic scenarios: ● If an effect arises from a cause, then that cause must also require a cause, leading to infinite regress. ● If a cause does not require a prior cause, it must exist eternally and would never generate any effect — thus invalidating causality.   This logic uses infinite regress to refute the possibility of real, independent existence. For instance, Chapter 1 of MMK (Analysis of Conditions) states: “If something possesses self-nature, it cannot arise from conditions. Because it lacks self-nature, it arises from conditions.” This illustrates that belief in self-nature leads to causal inconsistency or infinite loops.   2. Who coined the termt infinite regress? Nāgārjuna did not use the term “infinite regress” himself; it is a term adopted by later philosophers. Madhyamaka thinkers such as Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti further developed this argument, while in Western thought, philosophers like Aristotle and Kant institutionalized the concept.   Thus: Nāgārjuna employed infinite regress in his reasoning. But the term itself originates from later philosophical interpretations.   3. Additional note: In contemporary Madhyamaka thought, the infinite regress argument is commonly applied in discussions that reject: ● the idea of a first cause, ● inherently existing entities, ● or independent phenomena. It remains a critical logical tool in refuting the notion of self-nature (svabhāva).