中論第8-9章1
大家好！
《解讀龍樹菩薩「中論」27道題》第八章，
我在台南讀書會提過，如果能夠弄明白「黑暗」不是自然存在、也不是既定的存在，「黑暗與明亮」也是因緣法構成的，大概就懂了「黑暗與明亮」的無自性。（往下拉，參考5月讀書會內容）
因我在現場都是講重點，雖說他、她們也不見得都懂，但也是我反復提到的主要概念，
所以不想再回去第8章講，上次就跟讀書會成員約定直接講8、9章。
如若定義「絕對性」的因緣法，
必須清楚「因緣中有因緣」，
弄懂這些《中論-空論》便清析明朗。
如果覺得下面的截圖文章弄不懂，
可以看看AI的資料，這也是我個人用過的方法之一。
半寄
以下AI資料 「中論的無窮倒退（Infinite Regress）」問題，並不是由龍樹自己明確提出這個名詞，但他在《中論》（Mūlamadhyamakakārikā）中對「因果」、「自性」、「實有」等概念的批判，實際上涉及了無窮倒退的邏輯問題。因此，這一論證方式常被後人歸結為「無窮倒退論證」（infinite regress argument），屬於邏輯上的一種reductio ad absurdum（歸謬法）形式。
📚 1. 無窮倒退在《中論》的運用
龍樹針對「自性有」（svabhāva）進行批判時，指出如果事物是本質上自有的，那麼其因果關係將無法成立，導致以下情況之一：
若果從因生，那因也需要一個因，無限倒退； 若因不需因，那它就是永遠存在，果不會生出，因果不能成立。 這樣的論證方式就是用「無窮倒退」來否定「實體有」或「自性有」的可能性。 例如《中論》第1章〈觀因緣品〉中有說： 若有自性者，則無因緣生。 無自性故，故有因緣生。 這正是指出：若執著自性實有，會導致因果斷裂或無限迴圈矛盾。
🧠 2. 誰明確提出「無窮倒退」這個術語？ 龍樹本身沒有使用「無窮倒退」這個詞（這是後代哲學詮釋的用語）。 這個概念在後期的中觀學者（如清辯、月稱）中被更明確闡釋，並在西方哲學中如亞里斯多德、康德等被更清楚地制度化。
所以可說： ✅ 龍樹的中論在內容上已經使用了無窮倒退論證； ❌ 但這個詞（infinite regress）是後來的哲學詮釋，非龍樹創詞。
🔍 補充說明： 在近代中觀詮釋中，無窮倒退經常出現在「否定第一因」、「否定自性存在」或「否定獨立成立之法」的上下文中。 無窮倒退在中觀派中是破斥「自性見」的重要邏輯工具之一。
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Chapter 8-9 of Nagarjuna’s Middle Way: Mulamadhyamakakarika
Greetings, friends of NanZen!
Chapter 8 of Nagarjuna's Middle Way: Mulamadhyamakakarika
I mentioned during the Tainan study club that if one can understand that “darkness” is neither naturally existing nor inherently fixed, and that both “darkness and brightness” arise through dependent origination,
then one can grasp the concept of their lack of inherent nature.
(Please scroll down to refer to the notes from the Tainan study club in May.)
During the discussion, I typically focused on the essential points. While not everyone may fully grasp them, these are the key ideas I repeatedly emphasize.
Therefore, I don’t intend to revisit Chapter 8. We previously agreed with the group to proceed directly to Chapters 8 and 9.
If we want to define “the conditional nature of the absolute,”
we must clearly understand that “conditions are embedded within other conditions.”
With this understanding, Nagarjuna’s view of śūnyatābecomes much clearer.
If the article shown in the screenshot below seems difficult to follow,
feel free to refer to AI-generated materials — I’ve found them helpful myself.
Master Banji
AI Data The infinite regress issue in Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK) is not a term explicitly used by Nāgārjuna himself. However, his critiques of causality, intrinsic nature (svabhāva), and substantial existence inherently involve the logic of infinite regress. As a result, later scholars identified this method of reasoning as th einfinite regress argument, which is a form of reductio ad absurdum (proof by contradiction).
1. Application of infinite regress in MMK: Nāgārjuna’s critique of inherent existence shows that if things truly possess self-nature, then causal relationships collapse, leading to two problematic scenarios: ● If an effect arises from a cause, then that cause must also require a cause, leading to infinite regress. ● If a cause does not require a prior cause, it must exist eternally and would never generate any effect — thus invalidating causality.
This logic uses infinite regress to refute the possibility of real, independent existence. For instance, Chapter 1 of MMK (Analysis of Conditions) states: “If something possesses self-nature, it cannot arise from conditions. Because it lacks self-nature, it arises from conditions.” This illustrates that belief in self-nature leads to causal inconsistency or infinite loops.
2. Who coined the termt infinite regress? Nāgārjuna did not use the term “infinite regress” himself; it is a term adopted by later philosophers. Madhyamaka thinkers such as Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti further developed this argument, while in Western thought, philosophers like Aristotle and Kant institutionalized the concept.
Thus: Nāgārjuna employed infinite regress in his reasoning. But the term itself originates from later philosophical interpretations.
3. Additional note: In contemporary Madhyamaka thought, the infinite regress argument is commonly applied in discussions that reject: ● the idea of a first cause, ● inherently existing entities, ● or independent phenomena. It remains a critical logical tool in refuting the notion of self-nature (svabhāva).
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